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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusion

A. ISSUE

This research memorandum examines the following issue:
Superior Responsibility.

B. SCOPE OF THE TRIBUNAL

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) was established by the
United Nations Security Council in response to “genocide and other such violations
committed…between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994” and the Tribunal is
delegated the power to “prosecute persons responsible for [these] violations committed in
the territory of Rwanda.”1 Responsibility for the atrocities that occurred in Rwanda
should be imputed to and borne by those superior’s who failed to take reasonable
measures to prevent the commission of the crimes in question as codified by Article 6(3)
of the ICTR.

1

2 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(1998) [reproduced at Tab A]. Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda,
S/RES/955 (1994)* (Annex), 8 November 1994.
1

C. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSION

Superiors may be prosecuted for the offenses commissioned by their subordinates
under the doctrine of superior responsibility provided that certain preconditions are met.
Article 6(3) identifies the duty imposed on superiors and the general legal basis upon
which they can be held liable.2
Specifically, the Statute creates a duty holding that superiors who knew or should
have known that their subordinates were about to or did commit criminal acts were
required to take reasonable actions to prevent or punish subordinates. In addition,
liability is contingent upon the existence of a legal connection between the superior and
the subordinate’s offense.3
The knowledge requirement can be satisfied in one of three ways. First, by
demonstrating that the superior had actual knowledge. Second, by imputing knowledge
based on a “presumption of knowledge” standard. Third, by imputing knowledge based
on a “should have known standard.” The latter has gained greatest favor by the
Tribunals in recent years and can be accomplished by accumulating evidence that reports
of the acts in question were available to the superior.
Proving the legal connection between the superior and the subordinate (superiorsubordinate relationship) is the most problematic element of superior responsibility. A
chain of command must have existed in order to make such a connection.4 However, it
could be difficult for prosecutors in many instances to recreate the chain of command
2

Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, annexed to S.C. Res. 955, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
3
See ICTR Statute.

2

especially where conditions were chaotic in terms of leadership. The challenges faced by
prosecutors may be exascerbated by the fact that many of the offenses were committed by
paramilitary groups which do not typically operate along hierarchical organization or
regular chain of command.5

II. Factual Background

On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President, Juvenal Habyarimana, was killed when his
plane was struck by a surface-to-air missile.6 The President’s death triggered a massive
eradication of Tutsis by Hutu extremists.7 Between 500,000 to 1 million civilians are
estimated dead as a result of the widespread murder.8 Those responsible for the Rwandan
genocide represent a group that transcends every segment of society,9 including: (1) high
level government officials who facilitated the genocide, (2) military superiors who
supervised the murders, and the (3) first hand accomplices, typically civilians, who were
forced to kill by the other two segments.10
On November 8, 1994, the Rwandan Tribunal was established to investigate and
prosecute individuals involved in the act of committing genocide.11 Specifically, the
adoption of Resolution 955 (Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda) is aimed at
4

See ICTR Statute.
2 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda 244 (1998).
6
See id.
7
See id.
8
See 1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf, The International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda 47 (1998) [reproduced at Tab B].
9
See 2 Scharf, at 244.
10
See 1 Scharf, at 55-59.
5

3

prosecuting persons responsible for either genocide and/or other violations of
international humanitarian law committed between January 1, 1994 and December 31,
1994.12 Since its establishment, the Tribunal has convicted Jean-Paul Akayesu as a
superior of subordinates involved in committing genocide.13

III. Legal Discussion

A. THE DOCTRINE OF SUPERIOR RESPONSIBILITY

The doctrine of superior responsibility has only recently resurfaced as an effective
legal theory for addressing violations of international humanitarian law applicable in
times of modern armed conflict.14 The doctrine was developed in response to a legal
need to address those cases lacking any evidence that a superior had in fact ordered,

11

See 1 Scharf, at 72.
ICTR statute.
13
Prosecutor v. Ayakesu, Judgment No. ICTR-96-4-T (Sept. 2 1998) (visited March 12,
2000) <http://www.un.org/ictr/english/judgments/akayesu/html> [reproduced at Tab C].
14
Christopher N. Crowe, Command Responsibility in the Former Yugoslavia: The
Chances For Successful Prosecution, 194 note 8, U. Rich. L. Rev., Vol. 29 (Winter 1994)
[reproduced at Tab D]. “The underlying principles of command responsibility have
existed for centuries. For example, in 190 B.C., Roman commander Aemilius Regillus
successfully besieged the Greek city, Phocaea. In exchange for guaranteeing the safety
of the city, Regillus accepted its surrender. Regilulus’s troops, however, despite contrary
orders, sacked the city. Upon regaining control of his army, Regillus ‘punished those
chiefly at fault, restored freedom, lands, and goods of those victims whose lives he had
been able to preserve, and offered public atonement for the deeds.” id.; Marlise Simons,
War Crimes Tribunal Sentences Croatian General to 45 Years, N.Y. Times, March 4,
2000 (page omitted).
12

4

participated, or shared the intent of his or her soldiers or other subordinates who
committed crimes.15
Superior responsibility is based on the principle that liability for subordinate
criminal conduct can exist despite the absence of any direct or affirmative action taken by
a superior.16 Much like those exceptional common law jurisdictions that have established
a duty to act in situations that involve certain “legal” relationships, the doctrine of
superior responsibility has imposed on the superior a similar duty to act.17 In general, a
duty exists if there is a functional superior-subordinate relationship and the superior knew
or had reason to know that his or her subordinate was about to commit or had committed
a crime.18 Specifically, Article 6(3) of the ICTR formulates an express duty for
superiors.19 The duty refers to imputed liability20 that is triggered if a superior fails to
prevent or to take reasonable actions to prevent criminal activity or punish those who
committed criminal acts.21 Therefore, if subordinates commit crimes such as murder as

15

See Timothy Wu & Yong-Sung Kang, Recent Development: Criminal Liability for the
Actions of Subordinates The Doctrine of Command Responsibility and Its Analogues In
United States Law, 273, Harv. Int’l L. J., Vol. 38 (Winter 1997) [reproduced at Tab E].
16
See 2 Scharf, at 256.
17
Ilias Bantekas, The Contemporary Law of Superior Responsibility, 2, American Journal
of International Law, Vol. 93, No. 573, (July 1999) <http://www.asil.org/bantekas.htm>
[reproduced at Tab F].
18
See 2 Scharf, at 257-258.
19
ICTR Statute.
20
James C. O’brien, The International Tribunal For Violations of International
Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 651, A.J.I.L., Vol. 87 (Oct. 1995)
[reproduced at Tab G].
21
ICTR Statute, Art. 6(3).
5

referred to under Article 3 of the ICTR, the superior is guilty of the murder under Article
6(3) of the Statute.22
However, indirect responsibility necessarily leads to the yet unsettled question
concerning the extent, down the chain of command, to which liability can reach. The
further away up the chain of command a superior was from the subordinates’ criminal
acts, the more difficult he or she is to prosecute.23 In the past, different courts and
Tribunals have approached this particular issue by establishing, defining or redefining the
“should have known” standard. This standard has been codified by the ICTR and is
discussed in greater detail below.
Adding to the complications, many of the atrocities that occurred in Rwanda were
perpetrated by paramilitary groups which were lacking centralized organizational
frameworks and did not operate under any obvious command hierarchy.24 This can add
to the challenges facing prosecutors by making it difficult to establish a connection
between a superior, his or her subordinates, and the criminal conduct. In this respect, the
application of superior responsibility is factually dependent.25 For instance, “evidence of

22

W.J. Fenrick, Some International Law Problems Related to Prosecutions Before the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 112, Duke J. Comp. & Int’l
L., Vol. 6 (Fall 1995) [reproduced at Tab H].
23
See Kang, at 273.
24
See 2 Scharf, at 59. For the purposes of this brief, a paramilitary group is characterized
as non-military individuals that operated outside of the Rwandan military setting, but
could have been under the effective or functional control of either civilian or military
leaders. Complications can arise in gathering evidence of the superior-subordinate
relationship as in the former Yugoslavia in which “the military situation appears (on the
basis of information available at the time of writing) to be chaotic, with front-line forces
operating under opaque (and perhaps nonexistent) lines of authority, spotty
communications and rare direct orders.” See O’Brien, at 651.
25
See O’brien, at 652.
6

a pattern (similarity of atrocities, coordination among those who commit them),”26
decisions made or written orders,27 and their effective control, can support the inference
that persons with functional authority acquiesced in them.
There are three basic factors stemming from the more liberally characterized
doctrine of superior responsibility that, combined, have already had a major impact on
the traditional notion of command responsibility.28 First, the doctrine includes criminal
liability of civilian as well as military leaders.29 Second, leaders are liable for their
failure to prevent or punish illegal acts committed by subordinates if they knew or
reasonably should have known the subordinates were about to commit the acts.30 And
third, the doctrine invokes liability based on effective or actual control.31
The doctrine will continue to affect the scope of criminal responsibility in terms
of large scale international crimes as the doctrine develops in the Tribunals and within
international law. Thus far, the objectives of the doctrine of superior responsibility are
congruent with ICTR goals.32

26

See id. at 652-653.
See generally, The Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaskic, (unpublished text read by Judge
Jorda 4 March 2000) <http\\:www.un.org/icty/pressreal> (visited March 10, 2000)
(providing a recent example upholding superior responsibility) [hereinafter Blaskic case]
[rerpoduced at Tab I].
28
See Blaskic case (holding that the Trial Chamber found General Tihomir Blaskic guilty
under the doctrine of superior responsibility).
29
See 2 Scharf, note 951, at 261 (citing Claude Pilloud et al., Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at
1010 n.16 (1987) (citation omitted)) [reproduced at Tab J].
30
ICTR Statute
31
Bantekas, at 3.
32
Major Marsha Mills, NOTE FROM THE FIELD: My Observations of the Other
Tribunal, 22, Army Law (1997) [reproduced at Tab K]. The underlying purpose of the
ICTR is to target organizers, leaders, and inciters.
27

7

B. DUTY

The duty imposed by the doctrine of superior responsibility and codified by
Article 6(3) of the ICTR “now operates under agreed-upon principles.”33 “As the
[responsibility] of the superior is derivative of the subordinates’ illegal act, a duty must
exist if there is to be a legally relevant connection between the subordinate’s act, the
superior’s omission, and the eventual imposition of liability.”34 The duty component of
superior responsibility can be divided into two criteria: (a) standards of knowledge
holding that a superior is only liable if he or she had either actual knowledge or reason to
know of the crimes committed or about to be committed by subordinates (the mens rea
requirement);35 and (b) preventing or punishing the subordinates (the actus reus
requirement) holding that a superior must have taken reasonable steps to prevent or
punish the illegal activity of his or her subordinates.36
Despite the general acceptance of the criteria mentioned above, the standard of
knowledge continues to be malleable to a certain extent. This is because the mens rea
requirement is open to differing interpretations which has lead to a separation of the
knowledge standard into three individual categories: (1) actual knowledge (a subjective
test); (2) presumed knowledge (an objective test); and (c) “had reason to know” or

33

See Kang, at 278. Though perhaps only to the extent that it should include an objective
standard but not which objective standard.
34
id. at 290.
35
Bantekas, at 4 (citing Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to paragraph 2 Security
Council Resolution 808 (1993), UN Doc. S/25704, para. 56) [reproduced at Tab L].
36
ICTR Statute
8

“should have known” (also an objective test).37 It is generally agreed that actual
knowledge is not alone sufficient to constitute the entirety of the mens rea requirement.38
Limiting the mens rea requirement to actual knowledge would unnecessarily create a
standard too high to meet; it would require the proof of awareness.39 The presumed
knowledge standard imputes liability to superiors evidenced by widespread commission
and the notoriety of the crimes.40 The “should have known” standard is similar to the
presumption of knowledge standard but is more limited in its scope. The “should have
known” standard focuses on the link between the presence of reports of the crimes
available to the superior and the superior’s affirmative efforts in acquiring the knowledge
contained in them. None of the cases that have addressed the mens rea requirement have
restricted liability to hold that superiors must share the subordinate’s intent. Nor have the
cases supported the adoption of a strict liability or “absolute command responsibility.”41
As reflected by Article 6(1) of the ICTR,42 the mens rea requirement can impute
liability analogous to criminal complicity43 based on the a presumption of knowledge

37

Olivia Swaak-Goldman, Prosecutor v. Delalic No. IT-96-21-T, International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Nov. 16, 1998, 516, A.J.I.L., Vol. 93 (April 1999)
[reproduced at Tab M].
38
See Crowe at 226.
39
id.
40
id. (citing the Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita) (US Military Commission,
Manila (Oct. 8 –Dec. 7, 1945).
41
Strict liability would have a domino effect that could undermine the doctrine of
superior responsibility’s underlying purpose (i.e., so overbroad that it would be rejected
by the tribunals, therefore rendering the doctrine ineffective as prosecutor’s tool, and
thereby not having the deterrent effect desired on crimes of war). However, it can be
argued that the Yamashita Tribunal implicitly found the General guilty implicitly based
on a strict liability because it failed to address whether he did in fact substantiate his
ignorance of the crimes committed.
42
ICTR Statute Article 6(1).
43
See Bantekas, at 4; also see Kang, supra note 29, at 278. Command Responsibility
norms from Article 6(3) are usually cited in conjunction with the more straightforward
9

and/or a “reason to know” standard. Complicity, for purposes of superior responsibility is
subject to a type of notice that can be established “either from evidence of regular
reporting or from the existence of widespread reports that would have been known to a
reasonable person.”44 The nexus of superior responsibility as a form of complicity is
highly dependent upon the proper application of these mens rea requirements. Therefore,
a thorough analysis of duty with respect to superior responsibility should focus on the
ambiguity resulting in the application of the presumed knowledge or “should have
known” standards.45

1. Standards of Knowledge

The presumed knowledge and “should have known” standards have been
analyzed by several cases and Tribunals since World War II. For practical purposes, a
standard that imposes liability on a superior who did not know or did not have reason to
know is too broad and unfair to the accused. Holding an accused responsible because he
or she was a superior “by virtue of that fact alone, [and] guilty of every crime committed
by every soldier assigned to his command”46 is overbroad. On the other hand, a rigid
standard that is too heavily dependent on proving the accused’s actual knowledge or that

“planned, ordered, instigated or otherwise aided and abetted” (finding that Article 6(1) of
the ICTR is a replica of Article 7(1) of the ICTY).
44
See O’brien, at 652. A mens rea requirement similar to the “knowing facilitation” rule
of United States accomplice liability. “All ‘necessary and reasonable’ measures are
considered to have been taken when a defendant has taken all measures within his or her
physical power.”
45
ICTR Statute. However, this might permit some needed flexibility to incorporate
alternative mens rea requirements. Superior duties are embedded in the agreed upon need
to deter future crimes and that the positions of authority were taken voluntarily.

10

can easily be avoided by a claim of ignorance undermines its purpose of deterring
international war crimes.
Article 6(3) of the ICTR states that “[t]he fact that any of the acts…was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility
if he or she knew…that the subordinate was about to commit such acts…or had done
so.”47 Actual knowledge can be established through direct or circumstantial evidence.48
Circumstantial evidence can be based on a variety of facts and activities49 including “the
number, type and scope of illegal acts; the time during which they occurred; the number
and type of troops involved; the logistics involved, if any; the geographical location of
the acts; their widespread occurrence; the tactical tempo of operations; the modus
operandi of similar illegal acts; the offenders and staff involved and the location of the
commander at that time.”50
Article 6(3) of the ICTR also provides that “[t]he fact that any of the acts…was
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility
if he or she…had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or
had done so.”51 This particular element creates the two objective tests of the knowledge
standards. Because the language can be read to have two meanings, one premised on
Article 86 and 87 of Geneva Protocol I (1977) and one based on the Hostage Case

46

See Kang, note 17, at 275.
See ICTR Statute (emphasis added).
48
Bantekas, supra note 153, at page 15 (citing Prosecutor v. Delali, Judgment No. IT-9621-T (Nov. 16, 1998)) [reproduced at Tab N].
49
Bantekas, at 15 (citing Prosecutor v. Delali, Judgment No. IT-96-21-T (Nov. 16, 1998).
50
See Bantekas, note 155, at 15-16 (citing Final Report of the Commission of Experts,
Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), UN SCOR, Annex, UN
Doc. S/1994/674, para. 58 (May 27, 1994)) [reproduced at Tab O].
51
ICTR Statute 6(3) (emphasis added).
47

11

standard, there currently exists the presumption of knowledge and the “should have
known” standards.52 A brief review of some applicable case law can better illustrate the
origin of and the direction in which these two standards are currently heading.
Imputed knowledge can be traced back to the Yamashita Case which, despite a
lack of clarity in the commission’s approach to arrive at its decision, helped define the
modern contours of the superior’s duty.53 The case involved atrocities that were, as Major
Kerr argued for the prosecution, “so notorious and so flagrant and so enormous, both as
to the scope of their operation and as to the inhumanity, the bestiality involved, that they
must have been known to the Accused…”54
The prosecution argued that “the violations of the law of war committed by
Yamashita’s troops were…so extensive in number and dramatic in scope that they must
have been willfully permitted by the accused.”55 Testimony from hundreds of
eyewitnesses and a number of inferior officers were offered as evidence to link the
general to the atrocities.56 The prosecution alleged that General Tomoyuki Yamashita,

52

Crowe, at 226.
See Crowe, at 195 (citing Trial of General Tomoyuki Yamashita (US Military
Commission, Manila (Oct. 8-Dec. 7, 1945); See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 13-18
(1946).
54
See Crowe, at 198 (quoting AG 000.5 (9-24-45) JA Before the Military Commission
Convened by the Commanding General United States Army Forces, Western Pacific:
Yamashita, Tomoyuki, at 31). “The commission learned: how Japanese soldiers executed
priests in their churches…machinegunned [sic] residents in their neighborhoods, and
beheaded or burned alive American prisoners of war. It learned of Japanese torture…It
learned how one Japanese soldier tossed a baby in the air and impaled it on the ceiling
with his bayonet, and how others bayoneted an eleven-year-old girl thirty-eight times. It
learned of rape and necrophilia…It also heard testimony that Japanese soldiers were often
in intoxicated rages and as a result “men’s bodies were hung in the air and mutilated;
babies’ eyeballs were ripped out and smeared across walls; patients were tied down to
their beds and then the hospital burned to the ground.” id., note 28.
55
See id. at 200.
56
See id.
53

12

then the Japanese Supreme Commander in the Philippines and Commander of the 14th
Area Army, was personally responsible, albeit indirectly, for over one hundred of the
atrocities.
General Yamashita claimed in his defense ignorance and that the acts were
committed contrary to his stated orders.57 Yamashita made the following arguments to
which substantiated that his ignorance was genuine: time constraints to consolidate his
command; the inability to make personal inspections; the inability to maintain a
command from which to oversee all operations (due to battle conditions); integrated
communications collapsed; command had become decentralized on the island; the army
was divided into three separate fighting groups in order to avoid complete loss of control
of the army; gave subordinate officers autonomy over the separate groups.
The commission found General Yamashita guilty despite his strong argument of
genuine ignorance.58 The commission established that knowledge is presumed if the
commission of crimes is so widespread and notorious coupled with the lack of an
effective attempt to “discover…the criminal acts.”59 The Commission did not address the
issue of ignorance - that the General could have in fact lacked effective control over or
even had operational communications with his troops- in making its decision.60 In
imputing knowledge the commission stated:
It is absurd, however, to consider a commander a murderer or rapist because one
of his soldiers commits a murder or a rape. Nevertheless, where a murder and
rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread offenses and there is no
57

See id.
Crowe, at 200.
59
id.
58

13

effective attempt by a commander to discover and control the criminal acts, such
a commander may be held responsible, even criminally liable, for the lawless acts
of his troops, depending upon their nature and the circumstances surrounding
them.61
The presumption of knowledge standard relies on finding a great number of atrocities,
geographically and temporally, in relation to the superior’s command. A successful
application of this standard would hold that a superior willfully permitted the crimes
committed regardless if he or she can make a genuine claim of ignorance. The
Yamashita case did not clarify what actions taken by a superior would constitute effective
attempts to discover the criminal acts. Nevertheless, the presumption of knowledge
standard has been subsequently confirmed in Protocol I of 1977, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary, and Article 28(1)(a) of the ICC
Statute (1998).62
The commission’s presumption of knowledge approach in the Yamashita Case
was indirectly “reaffirmed by the United States Military Tribunal’s Hostage case”63
which embraced a somewhat altered variation of the standard. The Hostage Tribunal
borrowed from the presumption of knowledge standard an imputation of knowledge to

60

Kang, at 275.
See Crowe, at 203 (citing 4 Law Reports of the Trials of War Criminals, note 25, at 88
(1948)) (emphasis added) [reproduced at Tab P].
62
Bantekas, at 17 (finding that Article 87 of Protocol I derives its meaning only in
conjunction with Article 86 which holds superior’s responsible for acts that they “should
know are taking place”; ICRC “should be taken into consideration in reaching a
presumption that the persons responsible could not be ignorant of them”; and ICC Statute
“the circumstances at the time” should have enabled superiors to know of their troops
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superior’s but in a more limited fashion and established the “should have known”
standard. By adopting a standard based on the reports reasonably available to the
superior, the Tribunal held that General Field Marshal Wilhelm List “should have
known” of the crimes committed. He “should have known,” the Tribunal held, because
he was informed of the reports by his subordinates.64 The Tribunal concluded that “a
commander is charged with notice of occurrences taking place…[and] [i]f he fails to
require and obtain complete information, the dereliction of duty rests upon him and he is
in no position to plead his own dereliction in defense."65 The Tribunal further stated:
The reports [filed with headquarters] made to the [Accused] as Wehrmacht
Commander Southeast charge him with notice of the unlawful killings of
thousands of innocent people in reprisal for acts of unknown members of the
population who were not lawfully subject to such punishment.66
The emphasis of this standard also imputes knowledge, though not in such a sweeping
manner as found in the presumption of knowledge standard. The “should have known”
standard focuses on the availability of reports to the superior. “This raises a duty to
know, rebuttable only through evidence of due diligence.”67 A successful application of
this standard would depend on ample evidence of “reports made to the commander.”68
As in the Hostage Case, the fact that General List was given regular reports at his
headquarters of the crimes was sufficient evidence that he had the required “should have
known” mens rea to establish guilt.
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The recent Blaskic case appears to uphold the “should have known” standard of
superior responsibility in its finding General Tihomir Blaskic guilty for atrocities
committed by his subordinates.69 In this case, the Trial Chamber found “when General
Blaskic learned that crimes had been committed [he did] nothing.”70 The Trial Chamber
went on to state that:
There was no serious investigation…And when before this Trial Chamber he
accused the military police, the Jokers, in particular, what new information did the
accused put forth? He failed to say that the Joker commander, Vladimir Santic,
had his office in the Hotel Vitez at his headquarters. He asserted that he called for
an investigation…I quote his written order… ‘there are open rumors about the
events…’ The accused then explained…that the report transmitted to him by the
Security and Information Service was incomplete.71
The Trial Chamber found the general guilty as a superior for, among other charges,
failing to “take the necessary and reasonable measures which would have prevented the
commission of those crimes or the punishment of the perpetrators thereof.”72 It is clear in
this case that the Trial Chamber relied on the abundancy of reports and circumstantial
evidence supporting that General Blaskic “should have known” that his subordinate’s
were committing the crimes in question.
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The “should have known” standard is established in the case law as the mens rea
requirement.73 However, “the express formulation of Article 28(1)(a) of the ICC statute,
the explicit reference in the ICRC Commentary, and the unambiguous post-World War II
case law, confirm the existence under international law of a rebuttable presumption of
knowledge.”74 The former requires proof of reports directed to a superior’s headquarters
imputing knowledge if a superior has notice if he or she possesses sufficient
information.75 Whereas, the latter “can be read to permit the introduction of widely
published press accounts of the atrocities”76 and thereby providing a broader method of
imputing liability.

2. Reasonable and Necessary Measures

Superior responsibility incorporates an express duty to prevent or punish the
subordinates who are about to commit or had committed a crime.77 Article 6(3) of the
ICTR states that “[t]he fact that any of the acts…was committed by a subordinate does
not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if…the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators
thereof.”78 Aside from the need to quantify the terms prevent and punish in connection to
superior responsibility, there are two other issues that warrant analysis. The first issue
entails the implications of timing (i.e., when does the duty commence) and is particular to
73

Fenrick, at 115.
ICC et al. reprinted in Bantekas, at 18.
75
id.
76
Crowe, at 226.
77
Swaak-Goldman, at 516.
74

17

the duty to prevent.79 The second issue is the scope of the “necessary and reasonable
measures” element as it concerns both of the requirements.
Preventing and punishing offenses, as noted above, necessitates knowledge
(including constructive knowledge) that the offense occurred. Beyond the mens rea
requirement, the superior has a duty to make an affirmative action based upon the type of
knowledge known to him or her. The duty to prevent or punish exists within the confines
of whether the superior knew of the criminal acts before or after the fact.
The American Heritage dictionary defines prevent as: to keep from happening; to
keep someone from doing something.80 The act of preventing is anticipatory, as well as
reactive, to the targeted conduct. Preventing or intervening can occur at any time during
the process of committing the crime (i.e., from the inception of the crime up until its
execution). Furthermore, the act to prevent does not operate in terms of degree. 81 Either
something is prevented or it is not. Thus, once on notice, the superiors’ duty requires
taking the necessary and reasonable measures to completely prevent the commission of
crimes. The duty to prevent directly correlates with the severity of crime committed.
Therefore, “preventing” carries far greater implications in relation to a superior’s general
responsibility to control subordinates and this should be taken into consideration when
determining the superior’s punishment if found guilty.82
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The duty to prevent is initiated at the point in time when the subordinates “are
about to” commit such acts.83 The doctrine of superior responsibility could have been
bogged down by the quagmire present in the inherent ambiguity of the “are about to”
language. Yet, instead, the limited case law as well as the few governing statutes appear
to treat this issue favorably toward the goal of prosecution under the superior
responsibility theory. The “are about to” language, is a temporal element that is not
simply limited to the actions immediately leading to perpetration of the crime, as might
be the case in criminal attempt under U.S. Model Penal Code § 5.01.84 The duty to
prevent applies to the preparation or planning phase of the offense regardless of whether
the planners were going to carry out the crimes.85
Furthermore, the duty reaches as far as the subordinates’ criminal actions are
likely foreseeable. 86 Determining foreseeability is measured by taking into account such
things as the age, experience, and training of the subordinates.87 For example, the Kahan
Commission found clear indication (common knowledge) that there was a real and
foreseeable danger of “revenge and bloodshed by the Phalangists against the population
in the refugee camp,” and that the routine warnings that were issued by commanders to
the Phalangists “could not have had any concrete effect.”88 The Kahan Commission
further found that responsibility was imputed to the Minister of Defense, a politician
responsible for Israeli’s security affairs, for failing to prevent and for disregarding the
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dangers of acts of vengeance in light of the political, religious and the known state of
mind of the Phalangists.89 The commission stated “it was the duty of the Defense
Minister to take into account all the reasonable considerations for and against having the
Phalangists enter the camp, and not to disregard entirely the serious consideration
mitigating [sic] against such action, namely that the Phalangists were liable to commit
atrocities…”90
The duty to punish is both reactive and prospective. Punishing subordinates is a
response to the crimes committed and is used to deter the commission of future crimes.91
“[T]he superior who fails to act is in effect condoning the criminal conduct of a
subordinate and thereby sending a signal that such crimes can be committed with
impunity.”92 Unlike the duty to prevent, the duty to punish operates in terms of degrees.
However, due to the paucity of case law and statutory authority on this matter, it is not
entirely clear what constitutes a sufficient level of punishment to satisfy that a superior
has taken the necessary and reasonable measures to punish subordinates who have
engaged in criminal acts. Whether superiors adequately fulfilled their duty to prevent and
punish will need to be determined on a case by case basis.93
The scope of the duty to prevent and punish, in connection to what constitutes
necessary and reasonable measures, is not absolute.94 In other words, the duty is
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dependent on the superior’s material capability to institute and enforce the punishment.95
A failure to attempt to prevent or punish is not excusable even if the superior did not have
the power to intervene.96 It is limited by the actual and legal capabilities a superior might
have.97 The issuance of orders to apprehend and detain the subordinates responsible for
commissioning the crimes might not be a realistic option. It might not be practical in
most circumstances to conduct judicial proceedings. Furthermore, superiors might be
unable to physically detain subordinates. In such cases superiors will be required to
justify his or her failure to punish those responsible for the offenses. Superiors who fail
to make any affirmative actions to prevent or punish will be held liable for the crimes that
ensued.98 Superiors can only successfully discharge the duty to take necessary and
reasonable measures if “they employ every means in their power to do so.”99
“[Superiors] should be held to the requirement that they take all actions within their
physical power, regardless of legal limitations, to repress or punish violations.”100 To
avoid liability a superior will need to demonstrate an attempt to discover the existence of
the crimes, document the results of the investigation, and refer the case to competent
authority.101 Not unlike criminal attempt under the Penal Code, the duty to prevent
incorporates the rationale of protecting the general welfare of civilians to the extent
possible during substantial armed conflict by providing superiors a means to blunt
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criminal acts far enough ahead of time, though to a much greater extent, to effectively
impede perpetration of crimes by subordinates.102

C. SUPERIOR-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIP

The second component of the superior responsibility doctrine consists of the legal
connection between the superior’s position of authority and the superior’s personal
liability for his or her subordinate’s criminal offenses. 103 The legal connection is
accomplished by establishing that a superior-subordinate relationship existed. However,
establishing a superior-subordinate relationship (i.e., superior’s control) depends upon the
prosecutor’s ability to identify whether the individual was a corresponding subordinate in
relation to the superior in question. The scope of the relationship, and therefore the
doctrine itself, is limited to subordinates who are subject to the superior’s control which
can be determined by examining whether the superior had either de facto command and
de jure command.
Superior status is a conceptual classification that, as opposed to the narrow
strictures of the traditional command status, is not limited to military leaders responsible
for the conduct of their troops.104 Instead, it applies to any individuals notwithstanding
their official capacity, including civilian leaders, who were until recently, more or less
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protected from criminal liability.105 Superior responsibility has evolved from this aspect
of command responsibility because “there seems…to be no justification for the
proposition that a similar duty does not also apply to civilian leaders.”106 The Rome
Conference affirmatively adopted the position that command responsibility should be
extended to leaders in non-military settings.107 This model of superior status has been
affirmatively treated by international legal interpretation.108
Not only does the concept of superior status transcend both military and civilian
settings but it permeates official (formal) positions at the highest levels of decision
making hierarchies that are commonly found in governing institutions. 109 “The
customary international law doctrine of command responsibility as it is reflected in the
Tribunal Statute is applicable to military commanders, paramilitary commanders,
political leaders, and other leaders who exercise a high degree of control over
subordinates.”110 Article 6(2) of the ICTR, states that, “[t]he official position of any
accused person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible government
official, shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate
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punishment.”111 Therefore, in theory, those persons even at the highest levels in the
decision making hierarchy whether within a civilian or even a military setting, can be
held responsible for acts committed by their subordinates at the lowest levels of the
hierarchy.

1. Superior Status

In the context of superior criminal responsibility, the legal connection reflected by
a corresponding superior-subordinate relationship, a superior’s functional control, can be
identified by either: (a) de jure command which is dependent upon a finding of effective
or actual control; and (b) de facto command which is subject to proof of corresponding
subordinates.112 In addition, establishing control is dependent upon some form of
hierarchical chain of command. However, there are obvious difficulties attributable to
application of superior responsibility to paramilitary groups, and especially mob
situations, due to the inherent dependency on the presence of a chain of command to
establish the legal link between subordinate offenses and the corresponding superior.
A prima facie indication of superior control is de jure command which is assumed
“through official delegation [of] command from a pertinent office”113 and is typically
delegated by “formal executive structures, such as state entities [vesting] such authority
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by passing legislative acts.”114 Evidence that an individual has de jure command can be
made by “reference of the accused ‘in the overall organization, with a view to
determining [his/her] institutional functions.’”115 By this it is meant that the superior, by
virtue of his position within a chain of command, possessed the right of authority to
control the actions of his or her subordinates.116
Possessing the right of authority is not in itself a completely dependable basis
upon which to reference actual command responsibility but also must be complimented
by effective or actual control because officials can hold important positions within a
hierarchy but not fall within the necessary status in the chain of command to establish a
superior-subordinate relationship.117 In the Delali case, the accused was delegated a
position of authority within his municipality, his primary duty being to provide logistical
support. 118 However, he was not a commander for the purposes of superior
responsibility because, although he did have formal authority delegated to him, he did not
exert influence over others to the extent that he exercised effective or actual control.119
Effective control is the actual functional power based on, but no limited to rank,
authority, respect, or fear that a superior wields to force certain conduct. In the Sadaiche
Case, it was found that the Commander of the POW camp was acquiesced by his “more
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powerful adjutant”120 where “power to force a certain act inevitably involves the power to
demand and an actual capacity to impose obeisance.”121 Therefore, a showing of
corresponding superior-subordinate relationship is sufficient to create the legal
connection between the superior and liability for the subordinate’s criminal acts if a
superior is delegated the right to command coupled with his or her actual power to
manipulate the subordinate to execute requested acts.
The correlation between the superior and liability can also be based on de facto
control though it requires proof of a corresponding superior-subordinate relationship.122
The corresponding relationship may be found “through an analysis of the distribution of
tasks” within a given group.123 The distribution of task “is the cumulative effect of
evidence showing both subjugation to orders and respect for the authority of the
accused.”124 This appears to be applied loosely because the distribution of task test is not
necessarily premised on any type of formal delegation of authority. It has been pointed
out by the United States Military Tribunal that “superior means superior in capacity and
power to enforce a certain act. It does not mean superiority only in rank [since] it could
easily happen in an illegal enterprise that the captain guides the major…”125 Evidence of
a superior-subordinate relationship can be established “only if one exerts influence over
others [and] upon whom effective control is also exercised.”126
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In addition, a chain of command is essential to determine whether a subordinate
falls within the control of a pertinent and corresponding superior. Generally, a chain of
command is divisible into policy command, strategic command, operational command
and tactical command.127 The four stages of command provide a starting point from
which to determine whether individuals can be identified as subordinate to a superior
with de jure command and effective control. This is evidenced by the acceptance of
indirect subordination -as opposed to direct subordination of troops assigned to themover a civilian mob within the territory he or she occupies.128 Evidence of a chain of
command can be demonstrated by communication resources (i.e., radio equipment,
operational telephone lines, cellular telephones, transport, etc.,) and orders and reports
issued and received.129However, the greater the distance between the subordinate and the
superior along the chain of command, the greater the difficulty in establishing a
corresponding relationship. It appears however, that the chain of command concept is not
so limited as to exclude a type of imputed control because superior responsibility can
extend to territorial occupation and therefore apply to forces not under the operational or
administrative control.130 The recent Blaskic case established that General Tihomir
Blaskic had authority based upon the “effective measures…consisted of setting up a solid
chain of command,” the many orders produced at the hearings, and a signed orders.131
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Moreover, a standard for satisfactory operation or chain of command might be that the
“attacks were organized.”132
In the Akayesu case, the Trial Chamber found that he had de jure control due to
his position as the mayor (burgomaster) placing him as the head of the communal
administration and the officier de l’état.133 The Trial Chamber reasoned that Akayesu
had superior control (i.e., right to command and effective control) and therefore was
responsible to maintain and restore the peace by controlling his subordinates.134 “The
Prosecutor’s assertion that the de facto authority of the burgomaster in Rwanda was
significantly greater than the de jure authority. The Chamber concluded that the
burgomaster was the “parent” of the people, whose every order, whether legal or illegal,
was always obeyed without question.”135 The corresponding superior-subordinate
relationship exisits based on a chain of command arising from Akayesu’s status with the
community at large. In effect, the communities perception of him as a superior was in
part determinative for his was conviction of genocide under the doctrine of superior
responsibility.136

D. CONCLUSION

The crimes committed in furtherance of the Tutsi genocide in Rwanda, between
January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994,137 were committed by “virtually all segments
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of Rwandan society.”138 Participants include, “private individuals, such as members of
the militia, leaders of extremist parties,” as well as “Rwandan State authorities and, in
particular, senior national figures, such as a number of ministers, various elements of the
government security forces such as the Presidential Guard, the Rwandanese Armed
Forces and the gendarmerie, and certain local authorities, prefects and mayors.”139 The
atrocities of the Rwandan genocide have revealed many criminal acts committed by
various groups includingparamilitary groups for which civilian and military leaders are
responsible.
Rwandan prosecutors will need to demonstrate that leaders charged with superior
responsibility had superior status in the context of a corresponding superior-subordinate
relationship coupled with a duty to act as codified by Article 6(3) of the ICTR. This can
be accomplished by demonstrating that the accused had either de facto or de jure
command and effective control which is measured by the power or capacity to impose his
or her will over the respective subordinates. The Trial Chamber in the Akeyasu case has
implicitly suggested that corresponding superior-subordinate relationship can be
established by relying on the accepted and pervasive perception of the role that certain
individuals have within the community as demonstrated, for example, by a burgomaster
“parent” capacity. In this respect a community standard in terms of who is held
accountable as a leader can alleviate some of the difficulties in establishing concrete
chain of command.140 It is irrelevant under the doctrine of superior responsibility the
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position held by the accused, though the formal right to command is a preliminary
indication of superior status.
Defenses likely to made by the Accused are that superior status cannot apply due
to lack of communications, the inability to control troops, poorly trained troops or
civilians, and claims of ignorance. These defenses can be overcome by prosecutors by
accumulating evidence of regular reports of the offenses and their widespread occurrence,
lack of investigation and discovery of the offenses, and the requirement to obtain
complete information as proof that the Accused “should have known” and therefore was
derelict in his or her duty to prevent or punish. It is not apparent what would satisfy the
necessary and reasonable measures aspect of the duty to punish, yet, the duty to prevent
is based on a liberal application of foreseeability measured by the characteristics of the
subordinates.
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